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Abstract
Emotional similarity refers to the tendency to group stimuli together because they evoke the same feelings in us. The majority 
of research on similarity perception that has been conducted to date has focused on non-emotional stimuli. Different models 
have been proposed to explain how we represent semantic concepts, and judge the similarity among them. They are supported 
from behavioural and neural evidence, often combined by using Multivariate Pattern Analyses. By contrast, less is known 
about the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the judgement of similarity between real-life emotional experiences. 
This review summarizes the major findings, debates and limitations in the semantic similarity literature. They will serve as 
background to the emotional facet of similarity that will be the focus of this review. A multi-modal and overarching approach, 
which relates different levels of neuroscientific explanation (i.e., computational, algorithmic and implementation), would be 
the key to further unveil what makes emotional experiences similar to each other.
Keywords Emotions · Semantic memory · Similarity · Multivariate pattern analysis
A group of people, books, whether of a certain kind and certain 
states of mind are all grouped together as alike […] What 
holds them together […] is the evocation of a defining affective 
response (Bruner 2017).
Introduction
Emotional similarity refers to the similarity between the 
feelings that stimuli evoke in us. Poets and storytellers 
routinely use the power of emotional similarity to convey 
the emotional tone of a situation by analogy, for example, 
when the sadness that follows the breakup of a relationship 
is likened to that we feel when the weather is bad. As the 
famous song goes, it is ‘stormy weather, since my man 
and I ain’t together, keeps raining all the time…’. Accord-
ing to Bruner, stimuli that are very different visually and 
semantically may nevertheless be perceived as similar to 
each other because of the feelings they evoke in us (Bruner 
2017). For example, we may judge an image of a homeless 
person begging for food and an image of a businesswoman 
talking on the phone as different, even if the pictures are 
taken at the same street corner, because one evokes a nega-
tive feeling and one a neutral feeling. On the contrary, the 
same image of a beggar and an image of a person injured 
in a car accident may be evaluated as more similar if both 
evoke negative feelings, even if the pictures are taken in 
different places around the world. In Bruner’s discussion, 
emotional similarity is considered an orthogonal dimen-
sion to the visual and semantic dimensions of a stimulus. 
Alternatively, the emotional facet of our experience of a 
stimulus may be considered part of its semantic meaning; 
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in that case, emotional similarity may be reduced to a 
specific form of semantic similarity. This may be more 
appropriate when a person groups together neutral stimuli 
that they have experienced while the person is in the same 
mood. In this review, we define emotional similarity as the 
similarity between the emotional dimension of stimuli in 
the representational space. This space is in part objective 
and shared among individuals, and in part subjective and 
in continuous interaction with our experience.
The majority of research on similarity perception that 
has been conducted to date has focused on non-emo-
tional stimuli, such as words, object, shapes, faces and 
scenes. In these studies (Goldstone et al. 1997; Golonka 
and Estes 2009; Greene et al. 2014; Iordan et al. 2015; 
King et al. 2019), participants were involved in explicit 
similarity judgement tasks. In others (Haxby et al. 2001; 
Kriegeskorte et al. 2008a, b, Haxby et al. 2011; Bruf-
faerts et al. 2013; Clarke and Tyler 2014; Guntupalli et al. 
2016; Neyens et al. 2017), the main interest was the neu-
ral similarity, namely the similarity among neural repre-
sentations associated with non-emotional stimuli during 
tasks not related to the similarity judgements. By contrast, 
less is known about what makes people perceive richer, 
life-like events as similar, and even less when these are 
emotional. Understanding the cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms underlying emotional similarity may have implica-
tions for research on categorisation (Barrett 2004, 2017; 
Barsalou 2017), memory of emotional experiences (Talmi 
and McGarry 2012; Leal et al. 2014; Leal et al. 2018), and 
generalisation (Schechtman et al. 2010; Laufer and Paz 
2012; Dunsmoor et al. 2013). From a clinical perspective, 
the study of emotional similarity could help in understand-
ing why patients with anxiety disorders overgeneralise and 
judge a variety of subsequent experiences to be similar to 
the original fearful one (Lissek et al. 2009; Laufer et al. 
2016).
Below, we review the major findings and debates in 
the literature on similarity, with the goal of placing the 
concept of ‘emotional similarity’ within the context of rel-
evant research. With this aim, we will summarise two lines 
of research, one focused on explicit similarity judgements 
and the other on neural similarity. This is because both of 
them provide interesting information about what makes 
two stimuli similar, in terms of both cognitive dimensions 
and neural mechanisms. First, we will focus on semantic 
similarity, namely the similarity among non-emotional 
stimuli. We will use this literature as background for 
the emotional facet of the similarity, and to ask how the 
emotional similarity could be incorporated. Is emotional 
similarity a facet of semantic similarity or is a further 
dimension in a complex semantic space? We will end by 
proposing future directions in this research field.
Semantic Similarity
We may judge two stimuli, such as a blue circle and a blue 
ellipse, as similar, because they share some features (the 
rounded shape and blue colour). Because of the number 
of properties that they share, we will consider them more 
similar than a blue ellipse and a pink square. This is line 
with the ‘contrast model’, which posited that similarity 
between two items is a function of their common features 
weighed against their distinctive features (Tversky 1977). 
The ‘contrast model is limited in that it fails to consider 
the relationships among features (Markman and Gentner 
1993, 1994, 1997). These include thematic and taxonomic 
relationships, which widely contribute to semantic mem-
ory and similarity judgements (Lin and Murphy 2001; 
Ralph et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2011; Hoffman et al. 
2013).
Milk paired with jam is an example of thematic rela-
tionship. Thematic relationships are defined as any tem-
poral, spatial, causal, or functional relationships between 
objects, which perform complementary roles in the same 
scenario or event (e.g., breakfast) (Estes et al. 2011). It 
is widely known in the semantic memory literature that 
people judge thematically related stimuli to be more simi-
lar to each other than other stimuli (Simmons and Estes 
2008; Golonka and Estes 2009; Estes et al. 2011; Chen 
et al. 2013). The paradigmatic stimuli are natural, com-
plex pictures (Lang et al. 2008; Marchewka et al. 2014). 
For these stimuli, thematic relationships can arise from 
affordances (Maguire 2010), namely the possible actions 
that a person can perform in a specific situation. As shown 
by Greene et al. (2014), affordances may even be the most 
salient dimension in the categorisation of natural scenes. 
In that study, participants categorised natural complex pic-
tures mainly according to affordance, rather than visual or 
taxonomic similarity (Greene et al. 2014).
Labrador and Chihuahua are taxonomically similar. 
While visually these animals are different (different col-
our, size, etc.), they are also similar, because they share 
some features (both bark and are four-legged), which once 
related bring out the category dogs. Thus, we group these 
items in the same category, dogs, and judge them as more 
similar than items from different categories (Wisniewski 
and Bassok 1999; Chen et al. 2013; Xiao et al. 2016; Xu 
et al. 2018). People also generalise these properties to 
new items with similar features (e.g., German Shepherd), 
and attribute to these items extra features that define the 
category, even if those were never directly experienced 
(Jackson et al. 2015). Features-based categories are organ-
ised hierarchically in semantic memory (Rosch et  al. 
1976). Within this hierarchy, it is often possible to dis-
tinguish between different levels: the broadest level is the 
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superordinate (e.g., animals), then the basic (e.g., dogs) 
and then the subordinate (e.g., Labrador). Although some 
examples do not fit this neat classification (e.g., screw-
driver or lawnmower) and there are a number of contra-
dictory findings (Rogers and Patterson 2007; Taylor et al. 
2012), many studies showed that participants are more 
accurate and faster in categorising objects at the basic 
level than at the superordinate and the subordinate level 
(Anglin 1977, Horton et al. 1980; Murphy and Brownell 
1985; Mack et al. 2009; Iordan et al. 2015). Many of the 
stimuli in the emotional cognition literature have taxo-
nomic relationships. In the IAPS set, for example, a pic-
ture of a man pointing a gun and a man wielding a knife 
are subordinates of the basic level ‘aggravated assault’. 
Emotional events are the core of our life stories and their 
categorisation, as well as the similarity among them, are 
fundamental to make them meaningful. However, most of 
the studies focused on the neural mechanisms underlying 
the perception of similarity among neutral stimuli and on 
the neural representations of non-emotional stimuli during 
cognitive and perceptual tasks.
Neuroimaging Studies
It is possible to map in the brain the similarity structure 
observed at behavioural level, by using innovative Multivari-
ate Pattern Analysis (MVPA) methods. Among them, Repre-
sentational Similarity Analysis (RSA) gained popularity in 
neuroscience in the last decade to investigate the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms of perceived similarity. This tech-
nique allows combining neural evidence with behavioural 
and computational data by calculating their correlation. In 
this way, it is possible to test whether and where the simi-
larity structure observed at behavioural level is represented 
in the brain. In addition, this correlational-based technique 
examines the correlation between the neural representations 
of stimuli, as it is measured through the BOLD signal during 
cognitive tasks in fMRI, to draw conclusions about their sim-
ilarity (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008a, b, 2012; Nili et al. 2014). 
In a recent MVPA study, Iordan et al. (2015) explored how 
the different levels of semantic categories are represented 
across the occipitotemporal cortex. They hypothesised that 
categorisation may be an emergent property of the human 
ventral visual system. In order to test this hypothesis, they 
calculated the category boundary effect as the difference 
between cohesiveness (within-category neural similarity) 
and distinctiveness (between-categories neural similarity). 
This quantity provides a measure of how well categories are 
separated at each taxonomic level. For example, at the basic 
level, cohesion for ‘dogs’ is defined as the average correla-
tion between voxel activations associated with the presen-
tation of a ‘dog’ and any other type of ‘dog’. On the other 
side, at the basic level, distinctiveness for ‘dogs’ is defined 
as average correlation between voxel activations associated 
with the presentation of a ‘dog’ and, for example, a ‘flower’. 
They found high cohesiveness in V1, such that patterns elic-
ited by subordinates are not distinguishable. As we move 
up in the ventral visual stream (i.e., lateral occipital cortex, 
posterior middle temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus), 
the categories become more sharply distinguishable at basic 
level (Iordan et al. 2015). This is in line with other studies, 
which showed that inferior temporal regions are involved in 
semantic categorisation and perceived similarity of objects 
(Malach et al. 1995; Martin et al. 1996; Epstein and Kan-
wisher 1998; Grill-Spector et al. 1998; Kriegeskorte et al. 
2008a, b; Charest et al. 2014) and faces (Haxby et al. 2001, 
2011; Guntupalli et al. 2016). Thus, according to these stud-
ies, semantic knowledge is not ‘located in’ one brain area, 
but it arises from distinct patterns of response that are dis-
tributed across brain regions (Haxby et al. 2001).
A similar perspective is reflected in the ‘hub and spoke’ 
model, an influential model of semantic memory. Accord-
ing to this model, semantic categorisation is the result of 
an interaction between different modality-specific corti-
ces (i.e., the ‘spokes’) distributed across the brain, and a 
transmodal ‘hub’, located in the ventral part of the ante-
rior temporal lobe (vATL) (Rogers et al. 2004; Patterson 
et al. 2007; Ralph et al. 2010; Lambon Ralph 2014). In 
particular, the ‘hub’ integrates sensory, motor and verbal 
information that together define a concept, and which are 
encoded in the different ‘spokes’. It also extracts inter-
stimulus relationships that go beyond visual similarities, 
such as taxonomic and thematic relationships, and gen-
eralise these relationships to new stimuli with similar 
features. Many neuropsychological and neuroimaging 
findings, both in patients with semantic dementia (Bozeat 
et al. 2000; Nestor et al. 2006; Ralph et al. 2007; Jeffer-
ies et al. 2009; Guo et al. 2013) and in healthy controls 
(Pobric et al. 2007; Visser et al. 2012) support this model. 
The vATL interacts also with other brain regions, which 
are part of the semantic control (SC) network, to generate 
context-dependent semantic representations. This network 
include the posterior middle temporal gyrus, the prefron-
tal cortex, the intraparietal sulcus, the pre-supplementary 
motor area and the anterior cingulate cortex (for a review 
on this topic, see (Ralph et al. 2017)). Finally, as reviewed 
by Rice et al. (2018), the ATL is also involved in process-
ing socially relevant semantic concepts, including person 
face knowledge and emotional concepts (Zahn et al. 2007, 
2009; Olson et al. 2013; Collins and Olson 2014; Wang 
et al. 2017), because of its connection with the amygdala 
and orbitofrontal regions through the uncinated fasciculus 
(Highley et al. 2002; Von Der Heide et al. 2013). These 
regions might be thought as ‘emotional spokes’, which 
interact with the ATL to generate emotional concepts. 
Future studies are needed to test this hypothesis.
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To summarise, semantic similarity supports core cogni-
tive functions, such as semantic categorisation and semantic 
memory. Recent neuroimaging findings showed that concep-
tual knowledge is a widely distributed neural network, which 
include occipitotemporal and prefrontal regions. Different 
model have been proposed to explain the cognitive and neu-
ral mechanisms of semantic knowledge and similarity judg-
ments (Riddoch et al. 1988; Damasio 1989; Caramazza et al. 
1990). However, to our knowledge, these perspectives are 
limited to non-emotional stimuli, and have never been tested 
in the context of emotional similarity and categorisation.
Emotional Similarity
While the majority of the studies about similarity judge-
ments focused on non-emotional stimuli, a vast literature 
in emotion research asks what makes two emotional stimuli 
similar. To answer this question, participants are often asked 
to sort simple stimuli, such as words or faces, according to 
their similarity, or to rate the similarity among them on a 
Likert scale (Osgood 1952; Schlosberg 1952; Russell and 
Pratt 1980; Russell and Bullock 1985; Roberts and Wedell 
1994; Halberstadt et al. 1995, 1997; Calvo and Nummen-
maa 2008; Said et al. 2010; Koch et al. 2016; van Tilburg 
and Igou 2017). The paradigmatic finding is that partici-
pants judge the similarity according to two dimensions, the 
valence and the arousal of the stimuli. These dimensions 
are not explicitly used during the similarity judgements, but 
rather they represent implicit components of the cognitive 
structure underlying these stimuli (Barrett 2004). We can 
map this cognitive structure by using Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS) procedure. When represented in a geomet-
ric space, defined by valence and arousal as orthogonal axes, 
emotional stimuli are placed along the perimeter of a cir-
cle. This is the core idea of Russell’s ‘circumplex model of 
emotion’ (Russell and Pratt 1980) and other dimensional 
theories of emotion (Mehrabian 1980; Watson and Tellegen 
1985; Bradley et al. 1992; Plutchik 2001), which have been 
widely used in emotion research (Zevon and Tellegen 1982; 
Barrett and Russell 1999; Damasio 2003; Lang et al. 2008; 
Kuppens et al. 2013; Marchewka et al. 2014; Mäntylä et al. 
2016; Yu et al. 2016). In this representational space, the 
distance among stimuli reflects their similarity, with short 
distances representing high similarity. The multi-arrange-
ment method, a direct way to measure similarity, is based on 
this principle (Kriegeskorte and Mur 2012). This quick and 
efficient task is used for experiments with a relatively large 
set of stimuli, because participants simultaneously judge the 
similarity among many stimuli displayed together (Chikazoe 
et al. 2014; Chavez and Heatherton 2015), as opposed to a 
pairwise presentation.
Emotional similarity can be also quantified indirectly. 
Asking participants to rate the semantic relatedness between 
words (Talmi and Moscovitch 2004) or pictures (Sison and 
Mather 2007; Talmi et al. 2007; Gallo et al. 2009; Talmi 
and McGarry 2012) is an example of an indirect measure of 
similarity. This is because the higher the relatedness between 
concepts in semantic memory, the higher the similarity 
between them. These studies suggest that emotions increase 
the semantic relatedness, resulting in higher ratings among 
negative emotional stimuli compared to neutral ones. This 
might lead to a better organisation of emotional stimuli, and 
might explain the advantage they have in immediate memory 
tests (Talmi and McGarry 2012, 2013).
The findings above indicate that emotion increases per-
ceived similarity between stimuli. Greater perceived similar-
ity among emotional stimuli might be related to the effect 
of arousal on hippocampal pattern separation, the ability 
to store similar experiences in distinct and non-overlapping 
representations. This might explain why participants find 
it harder to discriminate between targets and similar lures 
when those are emotional (Segal et al. 2012; Leal et al. 
2014, 2018; Mattar and Talmi 2019; Zheng et al. 2019). 
Other studies suggested that the arousal might also increase 
the generalisation among neutral stimuli during fear condi-
tion paradigms, both in healthy controls (Schechtman et al. 
2010; Laufer and Paz 2012; Dunsmoor et al. 2013) and in 
patients with anxiety disorders (Lissek et al. 2009; Laufer 
et al. 2016). The generalisation is another example of indi-
rect measure of similarity, because the higher the similarity 
between stimuli, the wider the generalisation between these 
stimuli.
Neuroimaging Studies
The number of neuroimaging studies in emotional similar-
ity research is limited. To our knowledge, no neuroimaging 
studies have investigated neural differences in explicit judg-
ments of similarity among the prevalent stimuli in research 
of emotional cognition, namely, natural, complex neutral 
and emotional picture scenes. Only a handful of studies have 
combined behavioural measures of similarity with neural 
data by using RSA. The results of these studies might help 
in understand the brain regions, which code the similarity 
among emotional stimuli. In these studies, during the fMRI 
scan participants were asked to attend to pictures while per-
forming non-emotional rating tasks (e.g., ratings of indoor 
versus outdoor scenes). This was combined with behavioural 
judgements of similarity among the experimental stimuli. 
They found that brain activity patterns in regions involved 
in emotional processing, such as the insula and the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), represent the similarity 
structure between emotional and neutral stimuli observed 
at behavioural level (Chavez and Heatherton 2015; Levine 
et al. 2018).
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Additional, indirect evidence about what make two 
emotional stimuli similar to each other at neural level is 
gleaned from neuroimaging investigations of emotional 
processing and categorisation. These mainly aimed at 
investigating how the brain codes the relationship between 
specific emotions, supporting either a categorical (Ekman 
and Friesen 1976), a dimensional (Russell and Pratt 1980), 
or a constructionist view (Barrett 2017). In these studies, 
participants were asked either to passively look at images, 
to attend to the feelings they evoke, to rate the valence 
and the arousal of these feelings, or to rate the valence 
and arousal of the picture and categorise it according to 
emotional labels (Costa et al. 2014; Ohira et al. 2006; 
Machajdik et al. 2010; Baucom et al. 2012; Sakaki et al. 
2012; Yuen et al. 2012; Edmiston et al. 2013; den Stock 
et al. 2014; Motzkin et al. 2015; Hrybouski et al. 2016). 
The results of these studies were discrepant, probably 
because of the different perspectives of emotions adopted 
and methods used to elicit the emotions (Wager et  al. 
2015). In particular, locationist studies attempted to dis-
cover the unique brain feature associated with each emo-
tional category, by adopting a one (brain region)-to-one 
(emotion) approach. For example, fear has been consist-
ently localised in the amygdala (LaBar et al. 1998; LeDoux 
2007; Öhman 2009), disgust in the anterior insula (Calder 
2003; Wicker et al. 2003; Jabbi et al. 2008), sadness in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (Phan et al. 2002; Murphy 
et al. 2003), anger in the orbitofrontal cortex (Murphy 
et al. 2003; Vytal and Hamann 2010), and happiness in the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) (Lindquist et al. 
2012). As highlighted by Lindquist et al. (2012), supports 
for a locationist account would be found if instances of an 
emotion category (e.g., fear) are consistently and specifi-
cally associated with increased activity in a brain region 
(or in a set of regions within a network) across multiple 
published studies. However, first, many studies showed 
that the aforementioned regions are associated with multi-
ple categories of emotions (Lindquist et al. 2012), and dur-
ing many other sensory, perceptual and cognitive functions 
(Yarkoni et al. 2011; LeDoux 2012). Second, it is not clear 
whether the findings from the locationist literature are 
reliable enough or consistent across studies (Wager et al. 
2015). For these reasons, a psychological constructionist 
approach to emotion is preferable. According to this per-
spective, emotions are ‘situated conceptualisations’, that 
is, subjective interpretations of what is happening around 
us. Emotions arise from the interaction among many brain 
regions, interconnected in large-scale networks, according 
to a many-to-one approach. These brain regions are impli-
cated not only in emotional processing, but also in more 
‘cognitive’ functions, such as conceptualization (simula-
tion of previous experiences), language (representation 
and retrieval of semantic concepts), and executive atten-
tion (attention and working memory).
However, this represents only indirect evidence of the 
neurobiological underpinnings of emotional similarity. The 
neural mechanism that allows emotion to influence overall 
perceptions of similarity is still unknown, as are putative 
neural differences during explicit judgements of similarity 
between natural, complex neutral and emotional events.
Limitations in Emotional Similarity Literature
Although the emotional similarity literature provided 
interesting and relevant results, it is also limited in several 
important ways. First, most studies used decontextualized, 
simple stimuli, such as emotional faces, or words, a choice 
that yields more experimental control at the cost of eco-
logical validity. This is particularly important because the 
known influence of context on emotional categorisation 
(Barrett 2017). For example, Avierez et al. (2008) observed 
this effect in a study about emotional categorisation, where 
participants were asked to indicate the category that best 
describes the facial expressions. They were less accurate 
in categorising sad faces embedded in a fearful than in a 
sad context: they were more likely to categorise sad faces 
as fearful when the faces appeared in a fearful context than 
when they appeared in a sad context. The same effect was 
observed in the categorisation of disgusted faces embedded 
in a pride context (Aviezer et al. 2008). Future studies in 
emotional similarity should adopt complex stimuli, which 
depict both emotional and neutral real-world scenes, such as 
those provided in well-validated datasets, the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang et al. 2008) and 
the Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS) (Marchewka 
et al. 2014). So far, these more complex stimuli have seldom 
been used to study emotional similarity (Gallo et al. 2009; 
Talmi and McGarry 2012; Chikazoe et al. 2014; Chavez and 
Heatherton 2015; Levine et al. 2018).
As hinted above, one of the reasons that research on 
semantic memory and emotional similarity shied away from 
these more life-like picture scenes might be because there 
are many factors to control for during the stimuli selection. 
To mention some of them: the low-level visual measures 
(e.g., luminance, contrast, and color), the visual complexity 
of the pictures, the different degrees of similarity among 
taxonomic levels, the action(s) that the situation can afford, 
and the thematic similarity within emotional stimuli. In par-
ticular, as explained by Talmi and McGarry (2012), emo-
tional stimuli are more thematically inter-related than the 
neutral stimuli found in validated datasets. For example, the 
term car accident may be related to hospital, and then to 
death in a common scenario, while neutral stimuli, such as 
architecture, telephone and laundry, are less inter-related 
thematically. In addition, the range of themes within the set 
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of negative and arousing pictures (e.g. death, violence, car 
accidents, hospital scenes, and assaults) is reduced com-
pared to those within the neutral images. This is also in line 
with higher ratings of content overlap among arousing (both 
positive and negative) than neutral IAPS stimuli, observed 
by Gallo et al. (2009).
To our knowledge, there are no studies, which controlled 
for all these factors, and this represent a further limitation 
in emotional similarity literature. For example, few recent 
studies have controlled complex pictures (positive, negative, 
neutral) for visual properties, as well as for some elements 
of semantic similarity—animacy (Chikazoe et al. 2014) and 
social/non-social (Chavez and Heatherton 2015). However, 
like other studies (Yuen et al. 2012; Levine et al. 2018), they 
did not control the stimuli for thematic similarity. For exam-
ple, in the study by Chavez et al. (2015), the negative cat-
egories (i.e., social: ‘depiction of pain’ and ‘people crying’; 
non-social: ‘polluted water’ and ‘dirty toilet’) look more 
thematically related compared to neutral (i.e., social: ‘per-
son at a computer’ and ‘person on the phone’; non-social: 
‘a stack of book’ and ‘a spoon’) (Chavez and Heatherton 
2015). It is relevant to control for these factors to be able to 
decouple the effect of emotions and of other factors (e.g., 
thematic similarity) on the overall perception of similarity, 
both at behavioural and at neural level. For example, in an 
unpublished pilot study, we hypothesised higher similar-
ity ratings within 10 negative versus 10 neutral complex 
pictures, randomly selected from the NAPS database. The 
results supported our hypothesis. However, we could not 
conclude whether this effect was related to the emotional 
nature of the pictures or to a bias in the stimulus selection. 
This is because we did not control for the higher thematic 
similarity within the emotional pictures: the range of emo-
tional themes was reduced compared to that in the neutral 
set. The same reasoning would be valid at neural level, if 
we observe higher similarity within the activity patterns in 
occipitotemporal regions associated with emotional than 
neutral stimuli. Indeed, without a method to select natural 
scenes in a way that is representative of their frequency in 
the environment it is difficult to conclude that emotional 
stimuli are represented as more similar at neural level than 
neutral stimuli. To our knowledge, no studies investigated 
behavioural or neural differences between neutral and emo-
tional complex stimuli during direct similarity judgements.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Emotional similarity is a core construct in neuroscience, 
because it supports many cognitive functions, including 
categorization, memory, and learning. It is also involved 
in mechanisms underlying psychiatric conditions, such 
as anxiety disorders. However, very little is known about 
what makes us perceive real-life emotional experiences as 
similar. At behavioral, or computational, level, most of the 
studies showed that we implicitly consider the valence and 
the arousal as relevant dimensions during similarity judge-
ments. Although these studies were very successful in relat-
ing behavioral and neural data using innovative MVPA, they 
mainly used very simple and ‘non-naturalistic’ emotional 
stimuli.
At neural, or implementation level, we gleaned indirect 
evidence about brain regions involved in emotional similar-
ity from research on the structure of the emotional repre-
sentation of complex stimuli. However, they do not explain 
which mechanisms lead to the activity associated with those 
stimuli. As suggested by Barsalou (2017), this is a com-
mon mistake in neuroscience: most of the studies related 
the computational and the implementation levels, ignoring 
the algorithmic level, namely the latent mechanisms within 
the ‘system’ brain ‘that performs the task’ (Barsalou 2017). 
Future studies should relate all these levels of explanation 
in MVPA emotional similarity studies, which will benefit 
of new and well-controlled set of stimuli. This may help in 
unveiling the influence of emotional similarity on the over-
all perception of similarity. Finally, we might discover any 
neural and behavioral differences in this perception between 
emotional and neutral real-life events, to understand whether 
emotional similarity is a facet of semantic similarity or a 
further dimension in a complex semantic space.
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